I can't figure out when it would ever apply, at first thought. In a 100% curation system, the author gets nothing. So you could vote on any content you wanted and you would get the same reward, completely independent of whether it was your content or someone else's.
In such a system, there wouldn't even be additional direct rewards to be gained by making people think your content was "good" by upvoting it yourself, since if they did then vote for it, you wouldn't get any reward from their vote.
About the only think I could come up with is some indirect benefit of increased fame, but it's questionable how much "positive fame" you would get unless your content was actually good.
You're right it wouldn't make any difference for who people vote so my statement was only partially correct. 100% to curation is an extreme that doesn't make any sense. It was part of what I was pointing at. Again, I appreciate your opinion and I wish more top witnesses would have joined.
It's definitely an extreme case, and not one to explore right now, IMO, but it has been proposed before as an alternative to the current system and it "could" make sense.
In such a system, the blockchain pays rewards to good curators (i.e. investors) and authors only benefit indirectly (via recognition, advertising, etc).
It's not as crazy as it might sound at first: plenty of people write all the time now without expecting direct monetary rewards from what they write.
All that aside, I'm definitely not in favor of trying something like that on Steem.
I'm failing to see how the system can work without some sort of superlinear. (in reward to post reward as opposed to curation reward). Now, Steem is far from simple system and it's hard to foresee all possibilities.
Also, I didn't realize 100% curation shouldn't be ruled out outright so thanks for enlarging my horizons in that regard.
There is superlinearity in curation rewards now, it's just not based on stake. Essentially, the superlinearity is based off being the first to spot good content before others find it and vote on it. The early voters get more than the later voters. The idea is that this will encourage a curator to find the content that other people will vote on.
But this is often misunderstood right now: many voters think they get more for voting for a post that already has a lot of votes on it, when such votes actually get much less of the overall curation reward.
Most importantly, under 25% rewards split among all curators versus 75% going to the one author, this superlinearity is pretty much moot because the rewards are just so small relative to author rewards that the economics are totally skewed to self-voting.
The most important thing to do now is to change this percentage to allow for meaningful curation rewards. Then we can consider tinkering without how those curation rewards are apportioned after they become numbers that matter.
But even under 50% curation or even 75% curation wouldn't the big whale simply look to vote for themselves? Wouldn't exclusive self upvote be the surest strategy for best ROI for most of the large whales?
Under 50% (and especially under 75%) curation, it's definitely not the biggest incentive, even for a large whale, as long as other large whales also exist (or just a lot of other voters whose combined stake exceeds that of the whale). In such cases, the whale can make more by voting early on a popular post, versus voting for his own post.
Here's a simple hypothetical example at 50%, assuming the whale owns a whopping 1/10 of total voting stake (no current whales have this much stake, so it's an extreme case, but I wanted to demonstrate this holds true even for very large whales, it's even more true for those with less stake):
whale votes at full strenght for his own post, post gets valued at $100. Whale takes away the total reward of $100.
OR ALTERNATIVELY
whale votes early at full strength on someone else's post, this post is more popular, so all available voting stake votes for it. Reward is 10 times as great because all voters voted on it, so under linear rewards for post value = $100 * 10 = $1000 total reward. The author gets 50% (i.e. $500). The curators split $500, but the early voters gets a much larger percentage of this reward. If curation rewards were linear, the whale would only get $500*1/10 = $50. But by being an early voter, he gets substantially more. I don't know the exact math, but it's certainly more than $100 of the $500.
I can't figure out when it would ever apply, at first thought. In a 100% curation system, the author gets nothing. So you could vote on any content you wanted and you would get the same reward, completely independent of whether it was your content or someone else's.
In such a system, there wouldn't even be additional direct rewards to be gained by making people think your content was "good" by upvoting it yourself, since if they did then vote for it, you wouldn't get any reward from their vote.
About the only think I could come up with is some indirect benefit of increased fame, but it's questionable how much "positive fame" you would get unless your content was actually good.
You're right it wouldn't make any difference for who people vote so my statement was only partially correct. 100% to curation is an extreme that doesn't make any sense. It was part of what I was pointing at. Again, I appreciate your opinion and I wish more top witnesses would have joined.
It's definitely an extreme case, and not one to explore right now, IMO, but it has been proposed before as an alternative to the current system and it "could" make sense.
In such a system, the blockchain pays rewards to good curators (i.e. investors) and authors only benefit indirectly (via recognition, advertising, etc).
It's not as crazy as it might sound at first: plenty of people write all the time now without expecting direct monetary rewards from what they write.
All that aside, I'm definitely not in favor of trying something like that on Steem.
I'm failing to see how the system can work without some sort of superlinear. (in reward to post reward as opposed to curation reward). Now, Steem is far from simple system and it's hard to foresee all possibilities.
Also, I didn't realize 100% curation shouldn't be ruled out outright so thanks for enlarging my horizons in that regard.
There is superlinearity in curation rewards now, it's just not based on stake. Essentially, the superlinearity is based off being the first to spot good content before others find it and vote on it. The early voters get more than the later voters. The idea is that this will encourage a curator to find the content that other people will vote on.
But this is often misunderstood right now: many voters think they get more for voting for a post that already has a lot of votes on it, when such votes actually get much less of the overall curation reward.
Most importantly, under 25% rewards split among all curators versus 75% going to the one author, this superlinearity is pretty much moot because the rewards are just so small relative to author rewards that the economics are totally skewed to self-voting.
The most important thing to do now is to change this percentage to allow for meaningful curation rewards. Then we can consider tinkering without how those curation rewards are apportioned after they become numbers that matter.
But even under 50% curation or even 75% curation wouldn't the big whale simply look to vote for themselves? Wouldn't exclusive self upvote be the surest strategy for best ROI for most of the large whales?
Under 50% (and especially under 75%) curation, it's definitely not the biggest incentive, even for a large whale, as long as other large whales also exist (or just a lot of other voters whose combined stake exceeds that of the whale). In such cases, the whale can make more by voting early on a popular post, versus voting for his own post.
Here's a simple hypothetical example at 50%, assuming the whale owns a whopping 1/10 of total voting stake (no current whales have this much stake, so it's an extreme case, but I wanted to demonstrate this holds true even for very large whales, it's even more true for those with less stake):
OR ALTERNATIVELY