When implemented, 'diminishing returns' would still allow you to upvote anybody as often as you like.
However, if you would upvote anybody (let's say yourself) very often within a short time span
Anyway, already now voting power is decreasing with every upvote - with 'diminishing returns' it would just happen somewhat faster for upvotes on accounts we upvoted already several times (within a short time span)., every following upvote would just be somewhat weaker than the previous ones (if for example @haejin upvoted himself ten times per day(!), then the last upvotes would be comparable weak).
You wouldn't notice any difference if you upvoted someone once every day ...
UA isn't as efficient as superlinear reward to prevent abuse.
Actually I think "superlinear reward" favours self-vote abuse.
UA can be combined with every kind of reward curve anyway.
One could consider for example a formula like this one:
vote_worth = UA(voter) / UA(average) • SP • vote_strength
Anyway: thanks much for your thoughts and opinions (there need not always be a complete consensus).
Indeed. As explicitly stated by the original whitepaper. However, it also gives rise to counter-incentives. I'll clarify my position on the whole subject hopefully soon enough.
Diminishing returns, I'm not totally closed to the concept but my priority is to concentrate my energy as efficiently as possible to return Steem to sound economics.
In theory, yes, but do you think in 'real life' I would seriously dare to flag some whales (if I want to continue writing here)? :)
I am looking forward to read your coming article about the whole topic.
I know, and I really appreciate that!
It's really interesting what the original whitepaper says about flagging but I do agree with you it is much better to stay out whales' way but that doesn't necessarily apply to whales vs whales.