You are viewing a single comment's thread from:

RE: This has been a demonstration of optimal posting strategy under Hardfork 20.

in #steem7 years ago (edited)

I can get on board such a solution, that's for sure. But I don't see how.

Oh about the other part, I forgot the author is voting too (too focused on the not self voting part haha....). I'm not really that concerned about that extra stake coming from the author to begin with though.

How does the situation change for curation min maxers though? It seems only to change for the author.

(Edit: Oh yes of course. Those that wanted part of their vote to go to the author to begin with. Yes that is true.)

Sort:  

I can get on board such a solution, that's for sure. But I don't see how.

One way to do it is just assign the full 25% across the successful curators. You can keep the early voting penalty if you really want it. Take all the money you would be giving to the pool and add it to the curation reward pool of the post instead. This allows early votes to encourage later votes a little bit but not nearly as much.

How does the situation change for curation min maxers though?

Because the total curation reward for a post that has early votes will still be less, their curation rewards per vote will be substantially more on posts that get the full 25% because all the votes came in after fifteen. It doesn't really change a lot for them from the way it is now, but authors will want to encourage more curation rewards and thus more votes because the early votes don't benefit them anymore.

But I don't think people will change how early they vote because they aren't all going to agree to cast their votes all after fifteen minutes. The only thing that matters for a curator min maxxer is value currently on post, and expected total value of post. I suppose the latter might change a little bit, but it's hard to say exactly how.

(Re: equalizing, I think it should be more in that direction as well. Sqrt curve is pretty brutal)

The only thing that matters for a curator min maxxer is value currently on post, and expected total value of post.

It's not expected total value of post, it's (expected total value of post * percent paid out as curation). People already do this: I've seen my curation autovoters move around or leave based on how many early votes I buy. But right now I don't care because the early votes give me so much value. In the new system it's to my advantage to get as many of those people onboard as possible, and when the votes come in doesn't matter to my payout, so I want as few early votes as I can get.

Ah, not according to my reading of the code. The vote penalty is done on the votes themselves.

Whatever the numerical value displayed on the post, 25% gets shaved off and sent to curator payout processing. The penalty applies to what a curator would have gotten.

So I don't think it changes your strategy, at least if I'm right (goes to read it again...)

The penalty applies to what a curator would have gotten.

Yes, that's exactly what I'm talking about. The total curation payout on a post now can be as low as 10% because of early votes; a lot of mine are in the 13% range. Right now the extra chunk goes to the author, and in the new system it will go to the pool. It would be better if it went to the curators.

It also leads to an amusing passive-aggressive thing where I can reduce the curation rewards on other people's posts by voting on them early, or reduce the expected curation rewards voters see on other people's posts by voting on them early and then unvoting in the last 12 hours. Still thinking about whether/how I want to deploy that one. My vote isn't very big, but it's big enough to skew the curation rewards significantly, especially if no one votes for 15 minutes after.

Even funnier, if you want to hurt the collective profitability of a big bot and its user, up to a certain point it will be more effective to minute-zero upvote the post you expect to get botted than to downvote.

Reducing curation on another's post for future voters already happens in that way though, so I'm still having trouble seeing the difference.

The only thing possibly different is the first passive aggressive thing you mentioned. By voting early and before the author, you'd prevent an author from getting more from their own curation reward. But that's not something I think should be going to the author anyway.

(The voting, then unvoting thing can be done today with the exact same effect, roughly)

or... If I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying large early votes will deter later voters from coming, but that's already a thing that happens. Or maybe we are just talking about the effects on author's actions in this system.

On a final note-- going to curators sounds okay also, I can see how this would possibly still incentivize curators to come in even after early votes. (Though still, that sqrt reward curve....)

If I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying large early votes will deter later voters from coming, but that's already a thing that happens.

It's the next order up in the chain. Large early votes deter later voters from coming, now and later. But right now authors don't care because large early votes benefit them. This change means large early votes benefit no one, but still deter later voters from coming - so authors will want to discourage them.

It might help to think about it from the perspective of a new user who never knew that the current system existed. They just come in and are told that voting on a post in the first fifteen minutes will disadvantage everyone involved with the post, themselves, later voters, and the author. How do you explain that in a way that makes sense? "Well, the system used to be dumb, and we got rid of the part people were taking advantage of, but we left a big chunk of the part where it's dumb just to make it harder for you to understand."

It's like the people who designed this saw the problem as authors getting more rewards but not as voters getting fewer rewards. If one is true then presumably both of them should be.

Also, on a personal level, I would greatly prefer if 100% of my stake rewards value always goes to someone other than Banfield. The returned-to-the-pool thing essentially takes away my right to specifically not vote on anyone. This is a much more philosophical objection but one that's emotionally real to me.

(It's also one that reduces my appetite for flagging, since a flag does the same thing.)