How Wars End

Abstract

The bargaining model of war proposes that the initiation, continuation, and termination of war are all part of a single process to reach a negotiated settlement. Military combat, as defined under the bargaining model, serves to reduce uncertainties regarding the true balance of power and the likely outcome of war. A distinction between absolute and real war is made as well as a comparison of the bargaining model to the constructivist notions of war as a social convention. Finally, the paper discusses the enforcement of interstate settlement terms to ensure long-term cooperation and stresses the importance of a third party intermediary to enforce domestic bargains when resolving civil wars.

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Introduction

The bargaining or rationalist model argues that war is used as a mechanism between states to achieve a better settlement in the case of a dispute (Wittman, p. 743). Therefore, if two states disputing could know the outcome of a war in advance, they would each prefer to simply reach the same settlement without going to war and paying for its associated costs. In other words, two states would always prefer to reach a settlement (or bargain) peacefully rather than reaching the same settlement post-war. However, due to incomplete information pre-war regarding each side’s military capabilities and power, peaceful settlements are often an unfavorable option (Wittman, pg. 744). It is therefore essential to comprehend war in its entirety, including its processes of initiation and continuation, in order to understand the processes of reaching a settlement and ensuring its long-term enforcement.

The Causes of War

Under the bargaining model, there are three primary conditions through which war is likely to occur. First and foremost, war is likely to occur if the two sides do not share the same expectations regarding its outcome (Fearon, p. 381). Therefore, states who perceive themselves to hold equal power are often more likely to go to war than states who perceive themselves to hold a great difference in power. For example, Hitler acknowledged that he had underestimated Soviet power shortly after he ordered Germany’s invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June 1941. Even though Hitler had personally received revealing reports of Soviet capabilities, he failed to seriously consider their implications (Reiter, p. 29). If he had not miscalculated the strength of the Soviet military, he might not have ordered the invasion. Furthermore, the inherent differences in each side’s perceived power may also create the incentive for states to exaggerate their military strength. By doing so, their perceived power would increase and they would likely receive a better settlement. However, it is more probable that states would keep their capabilities secret since it may increase their odds of victory if they were to involve themselves in war.

Second, war is likely to occur if one side is unable to not commit to fighting in the future. For instance, it is often advantageous for a state to attack first. The outcome of a war, therefore, may depend on who attacks first, and so it becomes unlikely that both sides can credibly promise not to in a pre-war settlement (Fearon, p. 381). In addition, the balance of power may shift after a settlement such that one side’s relative power significantly increases. This would change the side’s expectations of the outcome of a hypothetical war, and so a real one becomes more likely to occur, especially if the side does not commit to maintaining peace. Moreover, war is likely to continue if one or more sides cannot credibly commit to upholding the terms of a settlement due to the lack of enforcement measures. For instance, civil war adversaries often lack an outside third party to enforce their bargain and ensure their ongoing cooperation, a security risk that will be further explored in a later section.

Finally, war is likely to occur if an item desired by two or more states is indivisible (Fearon, p. 382). In this case, bargaining can not result in a negotiated settlement, but rather one that is unconditional or not mutually agreed upon. While most issues are divisible and therefore negotiable, some items may be perceived as indivisible due to certain social factors such as discourse and culture, as emphasized by the theory of constructivism. For instance, the city of Jerusalem, while it is literally divisible like any other territory, is perceived to be indivisible by both the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs due to its significance in shaping their distinct religions and national identities (Reiter, p. 36). Therefore, constructivism provides an explanation for the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is supported by the bargaining model.

Constructivism and the Importance of Social Factors

For the most part, however, the constructivist theory of war contradicts the theory provided by the bargaining model, so it is worth exploring in greater depth to understand how it compares. While the bargaining model examines states as rational actors who weigh the expected costs and benefits of going to war, constructivism understands war as “a social convention determined and shaped by norms and culture” (Reiter, p. 36). One assumption the bargaining model makes is that a state’s consideration of an acceptable settlement with respect to the war’s outcome remains constant throughout the war’s duration. Constructivists may argue that the long and intensive act of violence itself can influence states to demand more extreme terms of settlement. Mixed with a strong degree of nationalistic pride and a collective vilification of the enemy, this argument may explain the demand for unconditional surrender by the Allies during WWII (Reiter, p. 36). Furthermore, constructivists may argue that war forms or strengthens a state’s identity. As a result, it can increase a state’s sense of nationalistic pride and refine the social distinctions found in a nation’s gender roles. Unlike constructivism, the bargaining model does not consider war to serve these important social functions as states act strictly according to an expected cost-benefit analysis.

The Role of Combat in War

Under the bargaining model, war is defined as a collection of military battles between at least two political groups. Combat fundamentally composes war; therefore, the role of combat must be adequately defined in order to understand war. To do so, it is important to first make the distinction between “absolute” and “real” war. Absolute war ends with the utter depletion of one side’s military capacity, whereas real war resolves without the complete destruction of any side’s military force (Wagner, p. 472). In practice, absolute war almost never occurs; rather, it used as a theoretical construct by states to model their cost-benefit analysis of continuing war. States typically do not end wars with the last-man-standing or by unconditional surrenders, although one notable exception is Germany when it surrendered in 1945. Germany’s surrender in 1918, on the other hand, yielded harsh but not unconditional terms (Reiter, p. 30).

According to absolute war, combat serves to completely destroy an adversary’s means to resist in order to achieve victory with the absolute authority to define the terms of an unconditional settlement. This is achieved through destroying an adversary’s military forces, destroying civilian assets, and occupying its territory (Reiter, p. 31). Attacking an enemy’s military force through a series of battles is the most direct way to decrease its capacity to resist, and it includes the capture or destruction of both military personnel and equipment. Civilian assets include non combatants as well as material goods responsible for the manufacturing of military supplies. For example, the United States nearly destroyed Japan’s war production capacity when it bombed merchant ships during the WWII Allied air campaign, which ultimately obliterated roughly one-third of Japan’s wealth (Reiter, p. 31). Capturing territory may improve a state’s ability to destroy civilian assets, but the capture of a state’s capital city has the potential to decisively end a war as it often holds significant administrative and economic power.

Ultimately, however, the explanation of the role of combat as a means to completely destroy an opponent’s capacity to resist is limited in that it does not encompass a state’s true motives during war. States typically do not expect to actually destroy the other completely; rather, they intend to cause enough destruction such that their opponent’s optimism regarding the outcome of the war is completely crushed. From there, the two sides can reach a settlement. The losing side may be prompted to offer a bargain in order to escape their potential fate of suffering the complete consequences of absolute war, which partially explains why real wars are more common than absolute wars. As the bargaining model argues, military combat is used as a method to advance political goals of a desired settlement. In other words, combat catalyzes the bargaining process if the two sides have competing expectations regarding the outcome of the war.

Combat in real war reveals information about the true balance of power and “allows states to test competing hypotheses about the outcome of a war fought to the finish” (Wagner, p. 476). Eventually, the expectations of both sides converge to reflect the same probable outcome of an absolute war, and a bargain is finally made. The failure of both sides to ever reach a negotiated settlement is often due to the continued perceived indivisibility of an item, which may be influenced by social factors as constructivism argues. Interestingly, the amount of combat during a war may determine the longevity of postwar peace. This is because each battle reveals information about the true balance of power; as more information is revealed, the convergence of expectations regarding each side’s capabilities strengthens and will remain relatively stable during a post-war period.

The Enforcement of Settlement Terms in Interstate and Civil Wars

While the bargaining model applies to both civil and interstate wars, a civil war faces a heightened difficulty to reach a negotiated settlement due to the lack of a credible third-party to enforce it (Walter, p. 335). Therefore, civil wars are significantly less likely to end via bargaining than interstate wars. Between the years 1940 and 1990, only twenty percent of civil wars ended with bargaining. On the other hand, fifty-five percent of interstate wars achieved a negotiated settlement during this time. As Walter asserts, most of the civil wars ended with the “extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side” without third-party intervention (p. 335). The minority of these civil wars that did have outside intermediaries to enforce their bargains always resolved in peaceful negotiations. When no legitimate government or institution yet exists during the aftermath of a civil war, it is necessary for a third party to step in to ensure both sides will abide by the terms of a contract. Civil wars have a high risk of one side defecting after a domestic settlement is reached, whereas interstate settlements do not face this problem to the same extent.

Unlike domestic settlements, interstate bargains can be enforced through various military and economic measures that have been established in the international system. States can build or maintain their own military defenses, for instance, whereas both sides after a civil war bargain would be left vulnerable by each other due to the demand of disarming their military forces. States can also form external alliances to strengthen their security. In addition, they can initiate systems of interdependence through various economic and trade activities to ensure cooperation, which is supported by the liberalist perspective on maintaining international peace (Walter, p. 337). While these measures do not guarantee one side will not defect after an interstate settlement, they limit the risk of cheating and the damage it may cause to an extent that both sides can be comfortable with.

Civil wars lack the various measures that may be implemented after interstate wars civil wars to ensure continued cooperation. While they lack the ability to become allies or form a system of economic interdependence, civil war adversaries cannot maintain their armed forces if they both reach a settlement (Walter, p. 338). A bargain strips both sides of their military capacity, creating a dilemma where they are both vulnerable to each other and unable to cooperate. In practice, most civil war adversaries recognize these security risks and never reach a bargain even if one is desired. Both sides understand that their opponent would gain by defecting against them in their insecure state, so they can simply not trust each other to reach a settlement whose terms are enforced by mere faith. For example, the Nationalist and Communist parties in China during the late 1940s could not come to an agreement due to their distrust in one another (Walter, p. 339). They both preferred to continue fighting since the risk of one side exploiting the other’s vulnerable state after a settlement was too high. Finally, civil war adversaries also face the risk of emerging malicious actors. Civil wars, without the presence a third party to enforce a domestic settlements and the formation of a recognized government institution, extend their periods of liminality and therefore increase the risk of an illegitimate actor (i.e. a terrorist organization) rising to power. Furthermore, both sides would no longer have the military capacity necessary to suppress an emerging malicious actor.

Conclusion

The process of ending wars begins with their initiation. When a bargain cannot be made under peaceful conditions, combat in war serves to shift or refine a state’s perception of its adversary’s military capacity and true balance of power. When the expectations of the likely outcome of an absolute war converge between adversaries after a series of battles, then a bargain is preferred to enduring the ongoing costs of war. Counterintuitively, a relatively high frequency and intensity of combat during wartime strengthens the convergence of these expectations and may guarantee a longer period of peacetime afterwards.

If adversaries cannot come to an agreement despite shared expectations regarding the war’s outcome, it is often because they perceive the item under dispute as being indivisible or they do not trust that the other side will uphold the terms of the contract. In an international setting, the settlement is effectively enforced by military and economic measures via the operation of military defenses, the formation of external alliances, and the creation of a system of interdependence. Civil war settlements do not have access to these measures and require an outside third party to enforce that all sides abide by the negotiated terms. Ultimately, the enforcement measures that all sides set in place during bargaining are essential to maintaining their peace after war.

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Bibliography

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization,49(3), 379-414.
Reiter, D. (2003). The Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics,1(1), 27-43.
Wagner, H. (2000). Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science,44(3), 469-484.
Walter, B. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization,51(3), 335-364.
Wittman, D. (1979). How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution,23(4), 743-763.