Welcome, dear Pholosopher!
I believe that each human being owns themselves and due to this, the initiation of force against other human beings is immoral.
I agree that initiation of force against other human beings is immoral, but for a different reason. Human beings do most certainly not own themselves. They can only borrow themselves for a few decades at most. For all they take, in order to live and grow, eventually they must return. While true that a man living on his own should not be coerced by others, one who is part of a community gives up a part of the ownership of himself willingly - in exchange for shares of everyone else; but now we're in Proudhon territory which reminds me I wanted to write an article on lazyness. Looking forward to your pholosophy!
Hey akareyon, thanks for comment and contribution to the discussion. I do have some counterpoints, however.
1)When we die we don't "return" ourselves to any rights-bearing actor.
2)How does interacting with others give them the right to control our bodies? That makes no sense as the person that uses the body has the better objective claim to it -- direct use. This is always the case unless the person has committed an aggressive act.
I personally recommend reading about Argumentation Ethics which explains the purpose of property rights. It immediately makes clear why the idea of communal "ownership" is antithetical to ownership. https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide
I am falling in love with Steemit because of people like you who, although in disagreement, see the value in an argument and uptuck anyway.
You seem to have a solid foundation of philosophical knowledge, so I owe you to explain my perspective.
Take, for example, a mother and her child. Both have, of course, complete ownership over their bodies, and nobody has the right to claim authority over them, or to coerce them to anything.
At the same time, both belong to each other. By giving birth, the mother has sealed a contract with her child, willingly giving up some of her self-ownership. While theoretically free to walk away, she is bound by nature's holy contract to nourish and care for the baby, which in turn means the baby does have a certain right to the mother's body (her teat in particular). Likewise, the baby, although it has the theoretical right to self-ownership, does simply not have the power yet to exercise that right - it cannot simply walk away, and gladly signs over some of its rights in exchange for food, love and pampers. Nobody in his right mind would seriously accuse the baby of "exploiting" or "coercing" her mother or vice versa.
And this scales up. As group-living animals, our interactions weave a web of interdependence across the community. If I live in a village of farmers, and I live by eating the fruits of their field, they have every right to expect me to do my part - or exclude me from their community if I invoke my right to "self-ownership" too often to justify my dolce far niente while they work hard to bring in the harvest. "You go own yourself", they will rightfully say -- and go on owning each other, gladly and voluntarily, to each other's mutual benefit.
You will forgive if I admit that I didn't have the time to study Kinsellas essay as deeply as it surely deserves. What I am getting at: the idea of self-ownership is a good one, in a theoretical, philosophical sense, but in the context of actual, practical communal life, portions of that self-ownership necessarily must be exchanged for a share of everyone else's self-ownership; and as long as this is a contract based on mutuality and free will (necessitating the very theoretical a priori self-ownership I claim does practically not exist), I see no harm or moral objection in it.