The American Who Waged a Tech War on China
China is racing to unseat the United States as the world’s technological superpower. Not if Jake Sullivan can help it.
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China is racing to unseat the United States as the world’s technological superpower. Not if Jake Sullivan can help it.
The Architect of America's Tech Cold War: Jake Sullivan's Mission to Outmaneuver China
In a sunlit corner office of the West Wing, Jake Sullivan, the White House National Security Adviser, keeps a small, framed piece of white fabric adorned with three red arrows. This seemingly modest display piece symbolizes one of the most significant shifts in American foreign policy in decades - a coordinated effort to prevent China from accessing the world's most advanced semiconductor technology.
The gift, which Sullivan crafted for his counterparts from Japan and the Netherlands, draws from an old Japanese parable about the strength found in unity. It serves as both a testament to Sullivan's diplomatic acumen and a physical reminder of the high-stakes technological cold war he has helped orchestrate during his tenure in the Biden administration.
The Evolution of a Policy Wonk
Jake Sullivan's Journey to becoming the architect of America's tech-focused China strategy is as remarkable as it is unlikely. A Minnesota native from an Irish-Catholic household, Sullivan was the archetypal academic achiever - memorizing world capitals by age 14, becoming a world-class debater, and eventually earning a Rhodes Scholarship. His rapid ascent through the ranks of Democratic politics led him to become Hillary Clinton's close adviser at the State Department by age 35, having already visited 112 countries in service of American diplomacy.
Known for his "relentless mind" and ability to speak in polished paragraphs reminiscent of his former boss, President Barack Obama, Sullivan cultivated a reputation for depth and substance. His early career was marked by an almost Socratic approach to policy discussions, turning over counterarguments methodically until every logical flaw had been exposed. During the Obama years, his even disposition earned him the nickname "Mr. Sunshine" at the State Department.
However, the Jake Sullivan who nOW occupies one of the most crucial positions in American foreign policy is a markedly different figure from the optimistic policy wonk of the Obama era. The transformation began with Hillary Clinton's unexpected loss in the 2016 election, which forced Sullivan to confront some uncomfortable realities about the foreign policy establishment's blind spots. During his time at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sullivan grappled with how globalization had failed to benefit average Americans and how the United States had unwittingly provided China with access to sensitive technologies.
The Third Wave Revolution
When Sullivan joined the Biden administration, he brought with him a revolutionary vision for American technology policy. In a speech at DC's historic Mayflower hotel, Sullivan outlined what he saw as the two previous waves of technological development: the first, when the Internet appeared to be a democratizing force, and the second, when authoritarian regimes co-opted these tools for suppression and surveillance. Sullivan called for a "third wave" - one shaped by US leadership and democratic values.
To execute this vision, Sullivan established a new directorate at the National security Council focused on advanced technologies like quantum computing and semiconductors. Despite the constant crush of global crises - from the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan to Russia's invasion of Ukraine - Sullivan never lost sight of the China challenge. As one former NSC official noted, "There was always a line for China, and tech competition was one of the bullets under China. It was the one thing that never got taken off."
The Semiconductor Strategy
At the heart of Sullivan's tech strategy was a focus on semiconductors - the tiny chips that power everything from smartphones to military equipment. The administration pursued a two-pronged approach: boosting domestic semiconductor production through the CHIPS and science Act while simultaneously working to prevent China from accessing the most advanced chip technology.
The latter effort required delicate diplomacy with key allies, particularly the Netherlands and Japan. The Netherlands is home to ASML, the only company in the world that makes the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines needed to produce leading-edge chips. Japan produces other critical equipment in the semiconductor supply chain. Sullivan spent months in quiet discussions with his counterparts in these countries, laying the groundwork for an unprecedented coordinated effort to restrict China's access to advanced semiconductor technology.
In October 2022, the commerce Department unveiled sweeping new export controls that prevented the most powerful chips designed by American companies like NVIDIA and AMD from reaching Chinese supercomputers. These controls were far-reaching, affecting any company in the world whose technology required US components, software, or workers to build. While this unilateral action was seen by some as a dramatic escalation in a second cold war, it also gave allies cover to follow suit.
The culmination of these efforts came in January 2023, when Sullivan hosted his counterparts from the Netherlands and Japan at Blair House. Though ostensibly there to finalize a mutual agreement, the United States had left little room for negotiation. As one Dutch foreign policy researcher noted, "It wasn't a conversation among equals." Nevertheless, both countries subsequently announced their own controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including ASML's deep ultraviolet lithography machines.
Building New partnerships
While one aspect of Sullivan's strategy focused on constraining China's technological advancement, another equally important element involved fostering new technological partnerships around the world. India emerged as a key target for this approach. As the world's largest democracy and China's neighbor, India represented an ideal partner in the tech cold war.
Sullivan developed an unexpectedly close relationship with his Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval, a former spy nearly twice his age. Their collaboration led to a new tech partnership between the US and India, which was showcased during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's state visit to Washington. The partnership included collaborations in semiconductor assembly, jet engine production, and space missions.
However, these new alignments came with significant compromises. Under Modi's leadership, India has increased online censorship, led the world in internet shutdowns, and allegedly used spyware against journalists and dissidents. Similar trade-offs were evident in partnerships with Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates, both countries with poor records on digital freedom but strategic importance in the tech competition with China.
Challenges and Criticisms
Sullivan's approach has not been without its critics. Some argue that the administration's actions have only made China more determined to invest in its domestic tech sector. Others question whether China's access to advanced chips truly represents the grave national security threat that Sullivan claims. There are also concerns about the moral implications of partnering with authoritarian regimes in the name of containing China.
Sullivan acknowledges these debates but stands firm in his conviction that the alternative - allowing China to dominate the global tech landscape - would be far worse. "We have challenges with American tech, to be sure," he said. "But if the world were dominated by Chinese or Russian or Iranian tech, those problems would be infinitely worse."
The Impact and Legacy
As Sullivan's tenure potentially draws to a close, the impact of his tech strategy is becoming clearer. China has struggled to advance its semiconductor technology in the face of coordinated export controls. Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger estimated earlier this year that there's a "10-year gap" between the most powerful chips being made by Chinese chipmakers and those produced by Intel and Nvidia, thanks in part to the export controls.
However, China has not remained passive. It has imposed its own restrictions on critical minerals used in semiconductor production and has been stockpiling older chips and manufacturing equipment it can still access. A robust black market for banned chips has emerged, and some Chinese companies have found ways to evade the restrictions.
For the White House, keeping pace with these workarounds has been a constant challenge. The administration has already updated its export controls multiple times, with allies following suit. This cat-and-mouse game is likely to continue well beyond Sullivan's time in office.
The Road Ahead
As Sullivan potentially prepares to exit his role (his wife is favored to win a House seat in New Hampshire), questions remain about the durability of his tech strategy. Sullivan himself believes that much of what he's built will endure, regardless of who occupies the White House next. "We are building something that is not political and partisan," he said, arguing that it "has a really good chance of being embedded as a durable part of US foreign policy going forward."
There may be some truth to this assessment. The Trump administration initiated the trade war with China that Sullivan built upon, albeit with a more isolationist approach. Vice President Kamala Harris has emphasized the importance of ensuring that "the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century." Many of the international agreements and partnerships Sullivan fostered won't be easily undone.
Conclusion: A Legacy in the Balance
Jake Sullivan's transformation from an optimistic globalist to the architect of a tech cold war reflects broader changes in American foreign policy thinking. His strategy represents a bet that by binding democratic allies together and investing in domestic technological capabilities, the United States can maintain its edge in the technologies that will define the future.
Whether this bet pays off remains to be seen. The global technological landscape is more unsettled than ever, and four years was always going to be too short to fully realize Sullivan's vision of a "third wave" dominated by democratic values. What's clear is that Sullivan has fundamentally altered the playing field of US-China competition, creating a framework that will likely shape technological development for decades to come.
As Sullivan prepares for whatever comes next, that small piece of fabric with three arrows remains on his bookshelf - a reminder of the delicate balance between competition and cooperation, between national security and global progress, that he has tried to strike. In the end, his legacy may be determined not just by how effectively he constrained China's technological advancement, but by whether the alternative path he charted truly leads to a more secure and democratic digital future.